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I. INTRODUCTION
The heightened level of takeover activity during recent years1 has pro-
voked many innovative responses from the management of subject com-
panies2 that wish to remain independent. Since successful acquisition of a
company usually involves the termination of its existing management,
that management will often seek to mobilize the resources of the subject
corporation to oppose the takeover attempt.3 As a result, litigation initi-
ated by management now plays a part in virtually every takeover contest.
The case of Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn,4 a recent Fourth Circuit decision,
illustrates the use of litigation to forestall a takeover attempt.
A. Dan River v. Icahn
Beginning in the spring of 1982, Carl C. Icahn5 and several companies
under his controlO (Icahn) began purchasing shares of Dan River common
1. See After Wave of Mergers, Analysts Debate Pluses, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1982, at D1,
col. 1.
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under Regulation 14D, adopted new
definitions in 1979 which discard the terms "offeror" and "target company" and substitute
the terms "bidder" and "subject company." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (b)(1) -(2) (1983). For the
purpose of consistency, these new terms will be used throughout this note.
3. Comment, An Implied Private Right of Action Under the Williams Act: Tradition vs.
Economic Reality, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 316, 316 (1982).
4. 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983).
5. Carl Icahn has achieved great notoriety in the business world as a corporate "raider."
By purchasing a significant interest in a vulnerable corporation, then forcing (or frightening)
the corporation's directors into buying back his shares or selling the corporation to a
"friendlier" company, Icahn nets a handsome profit. Corporations falling prey to this strat-
egy include Tappan Company, Baird & Warner Mortgage & Realty Investors, Hammermill
Paper Company, Marshall Field & Company, and Saxon Industries, Inc. This profitable
strategy reputedly has garnered Icahn over 45 million dollars in the past few years. See
Metz, Icahn's 'Scare 'Em' Strategy Faces a Big Test In Fight Over Dan River, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 17, 1982, at 33, col. 5.
6. The companies include Icahn Holding Corporation, Icahn Capital Corporation, Icahn &
Company, Inc., Brett Investors Corporation, C.C.I. & Associates, Crane Associates, Wolf In-
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stock on the open market. After acquiring five percent of Dan River's
oustanding shares, Icahn filed a disclosure statement pursuant to the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.7
In this statement, Icahn set forth its intentions regarding Dan River,
indicating that it would pursue any of three possible courses. Following
the acquisition of control, Icahn indicated that it intended either to
merge Dan River with one of its corporations or to sell the assets of Dan
River to generate cash for other business activities. Icahn conceded, how-
ever, that it would abandon its takeover plans and sell its Dan River
stock if given an acceptable offer.'
Icahn expected its reputation as a corporate "raider"9 to coerce Dan
River into accepting the latter proposal. Dan River's management, how-
ever, had no intention of falling prey to this elaborate corporate shake-
down scheme. Instead, they attempted to counter Icahn's strategy by re-
quiring that Icahn purchase the stock.10 Dan River then filed suit in
federal district court in Virginia seeking an injunction prohibiting Icahn
from dealing with Dan River in any way."' Pending a full hearing on the
merits, the district court granted a preliminary injunction to prohibit
Icahn from exercising any voting rights appurtenant to any shares owned
or acquired in Dan River. 2
Icahn appealed this preliminary injunction. Dan River offered several
defenses, one of which alleged that the disclosure statement filed by
Icahn was inadequate because it failed to meet the requirements set forth
in sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e) of the Williams Act' and in Virginia's
Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act. 14 Dan River lost on the disclosure issue,
with the court of appeals emphasizing that a defect in the disclosure
vestors Plan, Inc., and Michelle Investors Corporation. Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d
278, 280 (4th Cir. 1983).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited
as Exchange Act] is a continuous disclosure statute, applicable to issuers having securities
listed on a national stock exchange. The Exchange Act requires corporations with assets
exceeding one million dollars and with five hundred or more shareholders to comply with
the registration requirements. Id. § 781(g) (1982).
8. 701 F.2d at 281.
9. See supra note 5.
10. 701 F.2d at 282.
11. Id. at 281.
12. Id. at 282.
13. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)). The purpose of the Williams Act is effectuated through a complex set
of statutes and rules requiring the disclosure of certain types of information to the SEC and
the subject corporation upon the occurrence of specified events. See infra notes 51-65 and
accompanying text. See generally Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-
Growing Pains? Some Interpretations With Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. L.J. 654
(1971).
14. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -540 (Repl. Vol. 1978 & Cune. Supp. 1984).
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filings, namely an omission of an allegedly material fact, must assume
"actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. ' 15
Since it did not appear that Dan River would prevail on the merits of its
complaint, the circuit court reversed the preliminary injunction.16
Dan River also alleged that Icahn had violated the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)17 by engaging in a pattern
of racketeering activities, i.e. securities fraud, in this and earlier takeover
attempts. The Fourth Circuit found, however, that Dan River had failed
to establish the criminal intent necessary to prove securities fraud s and
thus denied temporary injunction relief on this ground as well.1 9
B. Management's Response To A Takeover Attempt
In resisting a takeover attempt, corporations frequently assume a de-
fensive stance analogous to that of a nation "girding" for war.20 Contes-
tants in these battles invariably allege violations of the Williams Act or
state takeover-bid disclosure statutes in an effort to obtain equitable re-
lief and thereby to forestall the takeover.2' Recently target corporations
have added RICO to their arsenal as an additional avenue for stalling a
takeover attempt.2 2 Congress has examined subject-management concerns
about these takeover bids, but refuses to ban takeover offers outright, rec-
ognizing that the process does create some benefits for the free market
economy.2
3
This note will examine the issues raised in Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn.2 4 It
will first discuss the statutes relied upon by subject management when
contesting a takeover attempt, focusing on sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e)
of the Williams Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
rules accompanying the Act, and the Virginia Take-Over-Bid Disclosure
Act. The note will then address the remedies for disclosure violations
available to subject management under these acts. Finally, the note will
discuss civil RICO and its use as a tool to ward off takeover bids.
15. 701 F.2d-at 286 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
16. 701 F.2d at 284. See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
18. See infra notes 213-15.
19. 701 F.2d at 280.
20. 114 CONG. REc. 21,483 (1968) (House debate on S. 510, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1967)).
21. See infra notes 25-93 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 196-264 and accompanying text.
23. 114 CONG. REc. 21,483 (1968).
24. 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983).
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H. THE BASIC DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
A. The Williams Act
1. Legislative History
Prior to the enactment of the Williams Act, a sharp contrast existed
between regulation of the proxy contest and the tender offer25 - the two
major vehicles for obtaining control of a corporation. While the proxy
contest was subject to comprehensive federal regulation," few regulations
governed the tender offer process. 27 This period of securities regulation
history was rife with attacks by corporate "raiders" who unfairly pres-
sured stockholders of subject companies into selling their shares by ex-
ploiting inherent weaknesses in the tender offer process. 28
Since the early 1960's, the cash tender offer29 has grown in popularity
and use.30 Firms bent on normal acquisition, as well as corporate "raid-
25. While the Williams Act does not specifically define the term 'tender offer," most
courts and commentators agree that:
The [typical cash tender] offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to
buy shares of a company - usually at a price above the current market price. Those
accepting the offer are said to tender their stock for purchase. The person making the
offer obligates himself to purchase all or a specified portion of the tendered shares if
certain specified conditions are met.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1978) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2811, 2811). See also SEC Proposed Rule 14d-i(b)(1), 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
24,281A (Nov. 29, 1979) (proposing a new definition of tender offer). See generally Wurcz-
inger, Toward A Definition Of "Tender Offer," 19 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 191 (1982); Note,
What is a Tender Offer?, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 908 (1980).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
27. Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids:
Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings].
28. The Exchange Act did not require a corporate bidder to disclose much information
about itself, its source of funds, or its potential plans for the subject company. Even plans to
fund the acquisition by liquidating various assets of the subject company did not have to be
disclosed. See generally Comment, Take-Over Bids In Virginia, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
323 (1969).
29. The current tender offer movement is accomplished by the use of cash rather than by
the securities packages in widespread use in the 1950's. Johnson, Disclosure in Tender Offer
Transactions: The Dice Are Still Loaded, 42 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 1, 2 (1980). See generally E.
APNow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 29-30 (1973).
For the purposes of this note, a cash tender offer will be referred to as a "tender offer."
30. In 1960, the aggregate of all tender offers was less than $200 million, but by 1965 that
total had risen to almost $1 billion. Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 17 (statement of
Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the SEC). See also 113 CONG. PEc. 24,644 (1967) (statement
of Sen. Williams).
The following factors have been suggested to explain the increased use of tender offers for
obtaining control of a corporation:
(1) Increased access to cash can result from greater corporate liquidity and readily
19841 379
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ers," began using the tender offer process as a means to gain control of, or
to strengthen ownership in, another corporation.3 This onslaught of
tender offers magnified the abuses in the existing tender offer process,
forcing Congress to take steps to improve the situation.32 Congress ini-
tially proposed legislation designed to protect the subject company and to
inhibit tender offers," but .this pro-subject-management approach was
abandoned with the enactment of the Williams Act in favor of a course
which balanced the interests of the subject company and the bidder.34
The Williams Act was not designed primarily to insure neutrality be-
tween the subject company and the bidder. Congress realized that corpo-
rate investors and stockholders were suffering while subject management
and bidders were fighting for control. Subject management could strip the
assets of the corporation in an attempt to fend off the tender offer. Share-
holders faced time constraints in deciding how to respond to the tender
offer and were often unable to obtain information about potential mana-
gerial policies or even the identity of the bidder. Securities investors sel-
dom knew whether their best interests lay in retaining their shares or
tendering them to the bidder.3 5
available credit;
(2) Relatively low price-earnings and cash or quick assets ratios, as well as compar-
atively low book values result from use of the tender offer,
(3) Proxy contests require those seeking control to convince shareholders that they
can better handle the affairs of the company than the incumbent management, while
tender offers appeal to shareholders strictly on a monetary basis;
(4) Tender offers have increased in respectability as a takeover technique, along
with greater sophistication and knowledge regarding the use of the tender offer.
E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 29, at 65-67. See generally Quade, Merger Volume
Up, But No Mania Seen, 68 A.B.A. J. 31 (1982).
31. In fact, a publicly announced tender offer is often met with a higher tender offer by
another company acting on its own behalf. Multiple bidders are becoming commonplace,
particularly if the subject company is a desirable acquisition. These multiple bids often
push up a stock's value to several times its former listed value. See Brown, Changes In
Offeror Strategy In Response To New Laws and Regulations, 28 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 843,
843-45 (1976).
32. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. 4 (1967). The bill came in response to the
sudden increase in cash tender offers which, in the period between 1960 and 1967, increased
from eight to 107. Id. at 2.
33. See, e.g., S. 510, 90th Cong., 2d Ses., 113 CONG. Rc. 24,662 (1967) (a bill to require
full disclosure of corporate equity ownership of securities).
34. The Senate Report for the Williams Act stated:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation
either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. The
Bill is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at
the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunities to fairly.
present their case.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. 3 (1967). See also H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d
Seas. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811 (House committee report on
the Williams Act) [hereinafter cited as House REPORT].
35. HousE REPORT, supra note 34, at 2812.
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2. The Regulatory Scheme
a. Introduction
The Williams Act was enacted in 1968 by a Congress sympathetic to
the plight of the corporate stockholder and investor."6 Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court, in construing congressional intent behind the Act,
concluded that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was to protect corpo-
rate shareholders and investors.3 7 The Williams Act added three new sub-
divisions, sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e), to the Exchange Act to deal
with the previously unregulated cash tender offer.3 These sections set
disclosure requirements applicable to purchases of, and offers to
purchase, stock in a public corporation.39
Since the shareholder in all tender offer situations must decide whether
or not to tender his shares, federal securities regulations4 0 require "full
and fair" disclosure of information necessary to aid investors in making a
reasonable investment decision. 1 But full and fair disclosure should not
be taken literally, since the disclosure of all facts concerning a particular
takeover attempt could produce more information than the public could
assimilate. Instead, the appropriate standard for judging the adequacy of
a disclosure statement is "fair accuracy, not perfection."' 42 The corpora-
tion filing should "fairly... disclose its plans in the event of a take-
36. It later became apparent that there were substantial gaps in the Williams Act. There-
fore the SEC, using its rulemaking authority, Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5,
84 Stat. 1497, has adopted several new rules to address these issues. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. pt.
240 (1983).
37. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977). The Court, after construing the
legislative intent behind this Act, concluded:
Congress was indeed committed to a policy of neutrality in contests for control, but
its policy of evenhandedness does not go either to the purpose of the legislation or to
whether a private cause of action is implicit in the statute. Neutrality is, rather, but
one characteristic of legislation directed towards a different purpose - the protection
of investors.
Id.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982). Although the Exchange Act regulated
tender offers and proxy contests, the cash tender offer fell into a "significant gap" in the
regulatory framework. Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 2.
39. Sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the Williams Act apply to any class of equity securities
that is registered pursuant to § 12(g) of the Exchange Act or any equity security issued by a
closed-end investment company. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(1) (1982). For a list of
the registration requirements, see id. § 781.
40. For the purposes of this note, the term "federal securities regulations" refers to the
Exchange Act, the Williams Act, and SEC Rule 240.
41. It is important to note that the most critical information to the investor, projections
of future earnings, need not be disclosed under the present system. Future earnings projec-
tions are discussed in 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810 (1979).
42. Purolator, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1981) (quoting
Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d 1, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1971)).
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over."4s It is not, however, required to "make predictions of future behav-
ior, however tentatively phrased,"' 4 4 since these predictions may be
misconstrued by the subject corporation and its shareholders.
The theory of full and fair disclosure is tempered by the concept of
materiality. This concept holds that all facts deemed "material"' 4 must
be disclosed to investors.46 By providing the stockholder with all material
information concerning a substantial accumulation of stock, the investor
can more easily make a reasonable investment decision.47
b. The Disclosure Provisions
The Williams Act requires the disclosure of information to shareholders
concerning potential shifts of corporate control. For regulatory purposes,
these shifts of control are divided into two categories: acquisitions of
stock by a tender offer, and acquisitions by other means. Sections 14(d)48
and 14(e)49 govern tender offers, while section 13(d)50 regulates non-
tender offer acquisitions.
(i). Section 13(d)
Section 13(d) (1)51 is the principal disclosure device of the Williams Act.
This section requires any "person" 2 who acquires "beneficial owner-
43. Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1970).
44. Id. at 1086.
45. What is or is not material will always involve a factual determination based on the
circumstances of the particular case. The present test is whether there is "substantial likeli-
hood" that a reasonable investor would think the information relevant. See TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1983) ("The
term 'material' when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to
any subject, limits the information required to those matters to which there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to
purchase the security registered.").
This concept of materiality considers the stockholder's need to receive useful information
without imposing unreasonable costs and burdens on the corporations which must supply
this information. For an in-depth discussion of materiality, see generally Hewitt, Developing
Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAw. 887 (1977); Comment, Disclosure of
Regulatory Violations Under the Federal Securities Laws: Establishing the Limits of Ma-
teriality, 30 AM. U.L. Ray. 225 (1981).
46. SECURrriES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuarras MAR-
KE s, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
47. HousE. REPORT, supra note 34, at 2812-13.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982). See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
52. Section 13(d)(3) provides that, "[w]hen two or more persons act as a partnership,
limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or dis-
posing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a 'person' .. .
Id. § 78m(d)(3).
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ship 5 3 of more than five percent of any class of a registered equity secur-
ity to file an information statement (Schedule 13D)" with the SEC and to
send a duplicate to both the issuer and the exchanges where the stock is
traded. This disclosure statement must be fied within ten days of attain-
ing more than five percent beneficial ownership. 55 The person filing is re-
quired to disclose: 1) the background and identity of all persons retaining
beneficial ownership of the stock; 2) the source and amount of funds or
other consideration for past or future purchases; 3) its purpose, plans,
and proposals with regard to the subject company; 4) the nature and ex-
tent of all beneficial stock ownership; and 5) any contracts, arrangements,
or understandings regarding the acquisition or disposition of shares, the
division of profits, or the giving of proxies.
56
To ensure continued accuracy of the provided information, section
13(d)(2) requires a "prompt" amendment of Schedule 13D to reflect a
percentage change in ownership or other material changes in the facts set
forth therein.5 7 While an amendment filed within ten days of the change
usually satisfies this requirement to file "promptly,"' s a more immediate
amendment may be necessary where there is a significant change.59
53. Beneficial ownership is broadly defined for the purposes of the Williams Act. SEC
Rule 13d-3 states that a person is deemed the beneficial owner of a security to the extent
that such person "directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding,
relationship, or otherwise has or shares: 1) Voting power including the power to vote or to
direct the voting of, such security;, and/or, 2) Investment power which includes the power to
dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1983).
The purpose of this rule is to prevent persons who agree to pool their interests from
evading the disclosure requirements, since each individually owns less than five percent of
the corporation's securities. See HousE REPORT, supra note 34, at 2817-18.
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1983).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982). This threshold amount was reduced from 10% to five per-
cent in 1970, in acknowledgment of the possibility that an accumulation of even five percent
could augur a change in control of the corporation, a change of which the investor should be
informed. H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. Naws 5025, 5027-28.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1983). See generally Block & Rudoff, Schedule 13D
Problems Associated With Large Accumulations of Stock, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1982).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (1983). Section
13(d)(6)(B) exempts parties whose acquisitions within the past 12-month period do not ex-
ceed two percent from the initial reporting requirements of § 13(d)(1). 15 U.S.C. §
78m(d)(1), (d)(6)(B) (1982). Rule 13d-2(a), however, makes it clear that even these parties
are not exempt from the amendment requirement of § 13(d)(2). 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2
(1983); Exchange Act Release No. 34-17353, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 182,698 (Nov. 28, 1980).
58. See, e.g., D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1974).
59. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720-21 (2d Cir. 1971) ("false statements
immediately place those required to file in violation of Rule 13d-2 which requires 'prompt'
amendment"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). See also In re United States Filter Corp.,
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 82,803 (Jan. 7, 1981) (amendment filed
one day after signing an acquisition agreement but three weeks after a change in intent is
1984]
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(ii). Section 14(d)
The second major disclosure provision under the Williams Act is sec-
tion 14(d)(1). 0 This section sets out filing and disclosure requirements, as
well as substantive regulatory protection for tender offers. 1 A bidder
commences a tender offer by making a public announcement by means of
a press release, a newspaper advertisement, or a public statement.6 "
Generally, section 14(d) requires that a person file a Schedule 14D-1
statement with the SEC"3 prior to making a tender offer for, or requesting
an invitation for tenders of, any class of registered equity securities which
would result in that person being the beneficial owner of more than five
percent of any such class.6 ' The disclosure requirements of Schedule 14D-
1 reflect those contained in Schedule 13D. Schedule 14D-1 additionally
requires the bidder to disclose: 1) past contacts, transactions, or negotia-
tions between the tender offeror and the subject company; 2) the applica-
bility of antitrust laws; 3) margin requirements of section 7 of the Ex-
change Act; 4) the financial statement of certain bidders; and 5) any legal
proceeding which may affect the tender offer.65
c. Materially Misleading and Fraudulent Statements
Section 14(e)66 of the Williams Act prohibits a variety of fraudulent,
not deemed "prompt").
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
61. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982) with id. § 78n(d)(1). Under § 13(d), disclosure
may be delayed for 10 days, and the more substantive provisions of § 14(d) may be avoided.
As a result, a § 13(d) acquisition is significantly less costly than a § 14(d) acquisition. Fis-
chel, Efficient Capital Marketing Theory, The Market for Corporate Control, and The Reg-
ulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tax. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1978).
62. 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-2(b) to (c) (1983).
63. Tender offerors are exempt from the requirements of § 14(d) if: 1) the total acquisi-
tions during the preceding 12 months would not exceed two percent of that class, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(6)(B) (1982); 2) the SEC determines that the bidder did not have the intent to
change, nor did he actually change, the control of the subject company, id. § 78m(d)(6)(D);
or 3) the bidder is the issuer of the shares, id. § 78m(d)(6)(C).
64. The § 14(d) definitions of the terms "person" and "beneficial ownership" are essen-
tially the same as those of § 13(d). See supra notes 52-53.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1983).
66. Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in
any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders
in opposition or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission
shall, for the purpose of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and pre-
scribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudu-
lent, deceptive or manipulative.
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deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices and any material misstate-
ments or omissions concerning a tender offer. The requirements of section
14(e) are not limited to the statutorily required disclosure statement and
other tender offer material, but include all conduct "in connection with
any tender offer. ' 67 This broad antifraud provision provides the basis for
most of the private litigation instituted under the Williams Act. 8 In some
circumstances, section 14(e) may be applied to misstatements made prior
to the effective date of a tender offer.6 9 Even statements made in advance
of a public announcement of a tender offer have the potential to negate
the disclosure safeguards enacted for stockholders' protection. However,
some factual nexus must exist between the misstatements and the tender
offer. If no tender offer was contemplated at the time the statements were
made, no factual nexus exists.
7 0
Section 14(e) is only a general prohibition against certain practices, au-
thorizing the SEC to promulgate the rules necessary to prevent fraudu-
lent disclosure to stockholders. In this regard, the SEC has used its
rulemaking authority under section 14(e) to design a rule, Rule 14e-1, to
prevent "lightning" takeover attempts. 71
Rule 14e-1 has two major provisions. A tender offer must remain open
for at least twenty business days,7 2 allowing shareholders of the subject
company time to receive and assimilate the information necessary to
make an informed investment decision. In addition, the offer must remain
open for ten business days after the bidder has increased the considera-
tion offered for the stock,73 removing the time constraints which could
lead to misinformed decision making.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
67. Id.
68. Rule 10b-5 is the broad antifraud provision that prohibits material omissions, mis-
leading statements, and fraudulent or manipulative practices in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. See 17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5 (1983). Section 14(e), containing
similar language, basically extends Rule 10b-5 to tender offers. See Golub v. PPD Corp., 576
F.2d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 1978); Hurwitz v. R.B. Jones Corp., 76 F.R.D. 149, 161 (W.D. Mo.
1977).
69. "It is well settled that statements made by either the offeror or the target company
prior to the actual effective date of a tender offer but after the announcement of the offer
and preliminary filings fall within the purview of § 14(e)." Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454
F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978). See also Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d
Cir.) (false and misleading statements made "on the eve of a tender offer" met the "in
connection with a tender offer" requirement), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980).
70. See Berman, 454 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1983).
72. Id. § 240.14e-l(a). Business days do not include Saturdays, Sundays, or federal holi-
days. Id. § 240.14d-l(b)(6).
73. Id. § 240.14e-l(b).
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B. The Virginia Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act
Prior to the 1968 enactment of the Williams Act, Virginia was the only
state to enact legislation regulating the tender offer process. 74 Since that
time, thirty-six states have enacted similar statutes,7 5 usually in an at-
tempt to fill in the gaps left by the Williams Act. The Williams Act is not
intended to preempt state regulation; indeed section 78bb(a) of the Ex-
change Act expressly recognizes the right of a state to legislate in this
field.76 The United States Supreme Court supports this view, holding that
"[this] section was plainly intended to protect, rather than to limit, state
authority."'7
To a large degree, the Virginia Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act7" (Vir-
ginia Act) reiterates the procedural and disclosure requirements set forth
by the Williams Act. Like its federal counterpart, the Virginia Act clearly
states that its purpose is to protect the shareholders and investors of a
subject company.79 Upon the announcement of a takeover offer, a disclos-
ure statement must be filed with the State Corporation Commission."
74. See Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (RepL Vol.
1978 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
75. Note, Kneeling To The SEC Rules: The Virginia Takeover Act and SEC Tender
Offer Rule 14d-2(b), 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 487, 487 & n.5. (1981).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) (stating that nothing in the Exchange Act "shall affect the
jurisdiction of the securities commission ... of any State over any security or any person
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder.").
77. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979).
78. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (Repl. Vol. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
79. "The purpose of this chapter is to protect the interests of offerees, investors and the
public by requiring that an offeror make fair, full and effective disclosure to offerees of all
information material to a decision to accept or reject a take-over bid." Id. § 13.1-528(b). See
also Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029, 1034 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he entire purpose of
the Virginia Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act has not been shown to be other than to protect
the interests of offerees, investors, and the public.").
80. This disclosure statement must contain:
(i) The name, address and business experience of the offeror and each associate of
the offeror;
(ii) The terms and conditions of the take-over bid, which shall include the applica-
ble provisions of § 13.1-530;
(iii) The source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be used
in making the take-over bid, and if any part of such funds or consideration is repre-
sented or is to be represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or otherwise
obtained for the purpose of making such bid, a description of the transaction and the
names of the parties thereto, except that where a source of funds is a loan or loans
made in the ordinary course of business by a bank or financial institution customarily
engaged in the business of making loans, it will be sufficient to so state;
(iv) Any plans or proposals that the offeror may have to liquidate the offeree com-
pany, to sell its assets to or merge it with any other person, or to make any other
material change in its business or corporate structure;
(v) The number of offerors' presently owned shares;
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This disclosure statement so closely parallels the one required by the Wil-
liams Act that a Schedule 14D-1 may be filed in lieu of the statement
required by theVirginia Act."l
The Virginia Act does differ from the Williams Act in some respects.8 2
First, the Williams Act is national in scope, while the Virginia Act is lim-
ited to companies that are incorporated and have their principal place of
business in Virginia. 3 The primary difference between these two acts is
that the Williams Act makes an offer effective on the day filed,8 4 while
the Virginia Act prohibits a bidder from making a takeover bid until
twenty days after a disclosure statement is filed with the State Corpora-
tion Commission. 5
The SEC has generally opposed the proliferation of state tender offer
legislation. In fact, the SEC has requested Congress to enact legislation
(vi) Information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with any
person with respect to any securities of the offeree company, including but not lim-
ited to transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements,
puts or calls, guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits, divi-
sion of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, naming the persons
with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been entered into,
and giving the details thereof ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531(b)(i)-(vi) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
For a list of exemptions to this disclosure requirement, see id. § 13.1-529(b)(fi)-(viii).
81. Id. § 13.1-531(b)(1). (Note though that the State Corporation Commission may later
require the bidder to supplement this disclosure with additional information.).
82. One major divergence between the two acts is no longer relevant. Previously, the Vir-
ginia Act had required purchasers of more than 10% of a Virginia corporation's stock to
refute a statutory presumption that control of the company was intended. Act of Mar. 9,
1980, ch. 216, 1980 Va. Acts 228 (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(b)(iii) (Cum.
Supp. 1984)). The court in Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 11982-1983 Transfer Binder]. FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,044, at 94,972-73 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1983), questioned the validity of this
presumption and determined that it placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce. Therefore, the court declared this presumption null and void as violative of the com-
merce clause. Id. at 94,973. In response to this decision by the Fourth Circuit, the Virginia
legislature repealed the provision concerning the presumption of an intent to change or con-
trol. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(b)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
83. State takeover statutes regulate the acquisition of control of publicly held corpora-
tions which have a certain nexus with the state. While some states may try to apply their
takeover statutes to all corporations organized within the state, see, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN.
tit. 8, § 203 (Repl. Vol. 1983), the Virginia Act applies only to corporations which addition-
ally have substantial assets and activities within the state. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(e)
(Cum. Supp. 1984). For a list of jurisdictional requirements of state takeover statutes, see E.
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEvELOPiiENTs IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 234-36 (1977); Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer
Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510 (1979).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531(a) (Cum. Supp. 1983). Given this early warning under state
law, subject management usually has the opportunity to plan defensive tactics to thwart the
acquisition attempt.
86. See, e.g., SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 351, at A-4 (May 5, 1976).
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
"which would make it clear [that] the Williams Act preempts the area of
regulation of takeover statutes.""7 Congress, however, has shown no incli-
nation to enact such legislation, and the SEC has utilized its rulemaking
powers to enact rules in direct conflict with most state takeover stat-
utes. 8 The five-day waiting period of Rule 14d-289 is one such example,
creating a direct conflict with the twenty-day pre-commencement waiting
period required in the Virginia Act.90
The Supreme Court, in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,91 addressed this conflict
between the SEC rules and state tender offer regulations and struck down
the Illinois pre-commencement waiting period as unconstitutional under
the supremacy clause.92 State regulation of interstate tender offers can
stand only insofar as it does not frustrate the Williams Act or place an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce.9 3 The practical effect of
this case makes the Virginia Act substantively and procedurally identical
to the Williams Act where interstate securities transactions are involved,
affording no added advantages beyond the additional recourse of seeking
relief from the State Corporation Commission.
III. REMEDIES
Before beginning an analysis of specific remedies available for disclos-
ure violations, it is necessary to review the responsibilities and obligations
of subject management. Every manager has a fiduciary duty to act as a
prudent businessman and to ensure that the company is organized and
operated for the benefit of its shareholders.9 4 This duty is fulfilled when
subject management exercises sound business judgment. The "business
judgment rule"95 grants management broad discretion in determining
what is in the best interest of the corporation, as long as this discretion is
87. Letter from Harold M. Williams to Sen. W. Proximire (Feb. 15, 1980), reprinted in
Rich & McSherry, Conflict Between Federal and State Regulation of Tender Offers. The
SEC's Challenge and New York's Response, 52 N.Y. ST. B. J. 446, 446 (1980).
88. This rulemaking authority is based on the broad grant of authority by Congress to the
SEC "to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement
the provisions" of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(l) (1982).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1983).
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531(a)(Cum. Supp. 1984).
91. 457 U.S. 624, 634-39 (1982).
92. Id. The Court held, "This ten day waiting period... underscores the basic purpose
of the Williams Act - to maintain a neutral policy towards cash tender offers, by avoiding
lengthy delays that might discourage their chances for success." Id. at 638 (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976)).
93. 457 U.S. at 630.
94. E.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-77 (Del. 1977); Kaplan v. Goldsamt,
380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977).
95. See generally Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Di-
rectors in Takeover Contests, 11 SEc. REG. L. J. 44 (1983); Johnson, Anti-Takeover Actions
and Defenses: Business Judgment or Breach of Duty?, 28 VmL. L. RE v. 51 (1982).
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"uninfluenced by personal considerations and is exercised in good
faith."9' The business judgment rule allows subject management to resist
a particular takeover attempt if it reasonably believes there are valid bus-
iness reasons to do so.
A. Litigation Under the Williams Act
A subject company may desire to bring suit in federal court to seek
equitable relief for a bidder's alleged disclosure violations. However, inad-
equacies in a bidder's disclosure statement will seldom succeed in block-
ing an offer. Normally, the only defensive benefit of litigation is delaying
the tender offer process, since disclosure deficiencies can usually be cured
by subsequent statements.
7
1. Implied Private Cause of Action
For the judicial system to protect a private party's rights and interests,
that party or another party who can and will assert such rights and inter-
ests must have standing to contest the offending acts or practices.98 The
Williams Act is silent on the issue of private causes of action;9 only the
SEC is given explicit authority to institute judicial enforcement
proceedings. 100
a. Development of the Implied Rights Doctrine
The history of implied private causes of action under the Williams Act
closely parallels the history of the implied rights doctrine. Federal courts,
which were uniformly liberal in allowing implied private rights of action
when the Williams Act was enacted in 1968, extended this liberality to
tender offer cases.101 Few courts have hesitated to imply a private right of
96. Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974).
97. See, e.g., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (E.D.
Mo. 1979). This delay, however, may be important, particularly if a takeover by a "friend-
Her" corporation is under way.
98. Since the Supreme Court emphasizes statutory construction in resolving both ques-
tions of standing and implied private causes of action, the Court often treats these issues as
a single inquiry. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court
constantly rephrased the issue as a cause of action for damages, id. at 24, 31, or standing to
sue for damages, id. at 35-36, 38.
99. In contrast, other sections of the Exchange Act expressly provide for private causes of
action. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982).
100. As the Act was originally enacted, even the SEC was not explicitly granted the au-
thority to sue. Congress amended the Williams Act in 1970 to give the SEC this privilege.
Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84 Stat. 1497, 1498.
101. See, e.g., J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-32 (1964) (concluding that private
enforcement was necessary to supplement the enforcement scheme established by Congress
in the Exchange Act). See generally Comment, An Implied Private Right of Action Under
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action in favor of virtually any conceivable plaintiff."' 2 The Supreme
Court, however, has significantly limited the implied rights doctrine in
the past decade. 103
b. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries
The Supreme Court, in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,10 4 for the first
time rejected the implication of a private right of action under federal
securities laws. In Piper, an unsuccessful bidder brought an action for
damages against a subject corporation, alleging violations of section 14(e)
of the Williams Act. 0 5 The Court, employing a stricter standard than
that used in previous decisions, held that before a private cause of action
could be implied, such cause of action must be necessary to carry out the
intent of the statute. 06 Congress clearly intended to protect the stock-
holder while maintaining neutrality between the bidder and subject
management.10 7
The Court analyzed the legislative intent of the Williams Act by apply-
ing a test developed in Cort v. Ash.105 The Cort test lists four factors to
be considered before the Court will infer a private cause of action:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted," - that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff?. Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consis-
tent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
the Williams Act: Tradition vs. Economic Reality, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 316 (1982).
102. As recently as January, 1977, an implied right for nearly every party to bring suit
under the Williams Act was virtually uncontested. E. ARANow, H. EINHORN, & G. BERLsTEIN,
supra note 83, at 104. Most courts prior to Piper did not even consider whether a private
cause of action could be implied. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter
Co., 535 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1976) (subject company's standing to sue is assumed under §
14(d)).
Only two cases restricted implied private causes of action prior to 1977. However, in
neither of these cases were harmful misrepresentations made to the stockholders. See Klaus
v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1975) (where the bidder was the party mis-
led); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 770 n.28 (5th Cir. 1974) (where the actual issue
was whether the bidder had violated any duties it had towards the shareholder).
103. See infra notes 104-12, 274 and accompanying text.
104. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
105. Id. at 4. The Supreme Court first dealt with disclosure violations under the Williams
Act in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975). Since the defendant did not
question the existence of a private right of action under the Williams Act or the subject
management's standing to sue, the Supreme Court declined to pursue these issues. Id. at 62.
106. 430 U.S. at 25, 42.
107. The availability of an action by an unsuccessful bidder does not provide a necessary
supplement to the congressional purpose of protecting corporate investors. Id. at 22-37.
108. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that
it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?109
The Court in Piper came to the conclusion that Congress did not intend a
private cause of action for damages to be inferred. Surprisingly, the Court
explicitly left open the question of whether a private cause of action for
damages could be implied for subject management under section 14(e).110
The Court concluded its analysis of section 14(e) by noting the limited
nature of its holding. As only money damages were requested in Piper,11
the Court did not address the question of standing to sue for injunctive
relief: "We intimate no view upon whether as a general proposition a suit
in equity for injunctive relief, as distinguished from an action at law for
damages, would lie in favor of a tender offer or under . . . §
14(e). .. ." Therefore, it appears under Piper that subject manage-
ment, as well as bidders, may have an implied private cause of action, at
least for injunctive relief, under sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e).
c. Federal Courts After Piper
Even after Piper, most courts do not consider whether a private cause
of action may be implied under the Williams Act.11 3 Those courts which
even mention the issue usually brush it aside by citing GAF Corp. v. Mil-
stein'1 4 for the proposition that a private cause of action for subject man-
agement is well established.1 5 A number of federal district courts, how-
ever, have recently begun to address the issue of an inferred private cause
of action for subject management, using the test developed by the Su-
preme Court in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis."" The
relevant inquiry under Transamerica is the intent of Congress. Other fac-
tors, such as the public interest, harm to the parties, and general consti-
tutional considerations, have been relegated to a position of vanishing
significance.117
109. Id. at 78 (original emphasis) (citations omitted).
110. Piper, 430 U.S. at 42 n.28.
111. Id. at 47.
112. Id. at 47 n.33.
113. See, e.g., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1977)
(assuming without discussion subject management's standing to sue under § 13(d)).
114. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
115. See, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1222-23 (4th Cir. 1980) (cit-
ing GAF Corp. as the "landmark authority" for the establishment of implied private causes
of action), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981).
116. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
117. Id. at 15-25. See, e.g., Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp.
92, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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d. The Virginia Courts' View
The federal courts in Virginia uniformly agree that an implied private
right of action exists for subject management to seek injunctive relief or
damages from a bidder for disclosure violations.11 The court in Dan
River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd.,"19 considered the implied private cause of ac-
tion and cited GAF Corp. v. Milstein2" as "the landmark authority on
the point.' 2' 1 In GAF Corp., the court stated that of all possible private
plaintiffs, "the issuer unquestionably is in the best position to enforce
section 13(d) .... [T]he issuer has not only the resources, but the self-
interest so vital to maintaining an injunctive action."1 22 The court con-
cluded that J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 2s stood for the proposition that an
inferred private cause of action under the Williams Act is well estab-
lished. 2' In later Virginia cases, the federal courts have not questioned
either the existence of a private right of action or standing to sue.1" 5
118. Although the general trend denies an implied damage action, see, e.g., W.A. Krueger
Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800 (D. Neb., 1979) (subject
management may sue for an injunction, but not damages, under § 13(d)), the Virginia courts
remain an exception to this trend. See infra notes 149-155 and accompanying text.
119. 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981). The court relied
entirely on previous lower court decisions and ignored the then-recent Supreme Court refor-
mulations of the implied rights test in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11 (1979).
120. 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). See also Missouri
Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1976) (subject manage-
ment's standing assumed under § 14(d)).
121. 624 F.2d at 1222-23. The Unitex court primarily examined Rondeau v. Mosinee Pa-
per Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 55 (1975) (involving a late filing under § 13(d), with the defendant
alleging that he was unaware of this duty to file after acquiring five percent of the plaintiff
corporation's stock). The Rondeau Court did not directly address the questions of standing
or the existence of a private right of action but focused on whether the plaintiff was entitled
to the injunctive relief requested. Id. at 59 n.9. The Unitex court, 624 F.2d at 1223, con-
cluded that Rondeau had not affected the holding in GAF Corp. The court also noted that
Rondeau reserved the right to injunctive relief under § 13(d) and that Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42 n.28 (1977), reserved the issue of whether the subject company
has standing under § 14(e). Unitex, 624 F.2d at 1222.
122. 453 F.2d at 719.
123. 377 U.S. 426, 430-35 (1964) (providing the basic foundation for decisions inferring a
private cause of action under federal securities regulations and focusing on the adequacy of
existing liability provisions to implement congressional intent to provide a private cause of
action for § 14(a) violations).
124. 453 F.2d at 719.
125. See, e.g., Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,044 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1983); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.
1983).
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2. Civil Remedies
a. Injunctive Relief
The problem of determining appropriate relief for disclosure violations
presents a challenge to the judiciary because of timing problems inherent
in the tender offer process. Since violations of this sort can quickly injure
the stockholder, courts must be able to provide swift judicial aid. 26
Courts commonly employ the interlocutory injunction to accomplish this
goal.
(i). Interlocutory Injunctions
An interlocutory injunction127 may be issued at any time to preserve
the status quo pending a determination on the merits.12 Once granted, an
interlocutory injunction stands as a binding restraint on the respondent
until rescinded by further action of the court. 29
There are two types of interlocutory injunctions: the preliminary in-
junction and the temporary restraining order. 30 These two interlocutory
injunctions are essentially the same except that, with a temporary re-
straining order, the respondent is given no notice or opportunity to be
heard. Since there is no hearing for a temporary restraining order and the
hearing for a preliminary injunction is usually limited in scope, various
126. Courts have the power to enforce interlocutory and permanent injunctions by means
of contempt proceedings. Every court of the United States has the inherent power to pun-
ish, by fine or imprisonment, any willful disregard or disobedience of any lawful writ, pro-
cess, order, rule, or decree. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). See generally Note, Preliminary Injunc-
tive Relief and Tender Offers: An Analysis Under The Williams Act, 49 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 563 (1981).
127. Because an interlocutory injunction is equitable in nature, the petitioner is subject to
the traditional defenses recognized by courts of equity. Therefore, if both the bidder and
subject management violate the Williams Act, a court would rule that the parties were in
pan delicto and refuse to grant an interlocutory injunction. See, e.g., Cauble v. White, 360
F. Supp. 1021, 1029 (E.D. La. 1973). In addition, federal courts have uniformly held that a
trial court's decision to grant or deny an injunction should be upheld, absent a clear abuse
of discretion or an erroneous application of legal principles. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco,
Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 770 (5th Cir. 1974).
128. American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225, 233-34 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
207 U.S. 597 (1907). An interlocutory injunction also aids the court by preventing the re-
spondent from taking action which could prevent the court from granting any meaningful
relief after a trial.
129. Kent Prods., Inc. v. Hoegh, 245 Iowa 205, ., 61 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1953).
130. The temporary restraining order (TRO) is issued ex parte, and is normally granted
only where the petitioner will suffer irreparable injury if relief is not granted immediately. A
TRO will preserve the status quo until the court can determine whether a preliminary in-
junction should be granted. See Inhabitants of Lincoinville v. Perry, 150 Me. 113, ., 104
A.2d 884, 887 (1954); Perseverance Common School Dist. v. Honey, 367 S.W.2d 243, 246
(Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
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safeguards have been devised by courts to prevent abuse of these interloc-
utory injunctions. The most important safeguard requires the petitioner
to post a bond to protect the respondent's rights if the petitioner ulti-
mately fails at trial.18'
Courts follow two basic approaches in deciding whether to impose a
preliminary injunction. The first approach was originated by courts which
believed it easier to enjoin a proposed tender offer than to try to correct
it after the completion of a fraudulent or deceptive transaction.12 Courts
following this line of reasoning have relaxed the requirements necessary
for a preliminary injunction by utilizing a disjunctive test that requires a
petitioner to show either probable success on the merits and possible ir-
reparable injury"" or a sufficiently serious question about the merits and
a balance of hardship in the petitioner's favor.8 4
The second approach, at the other end of the spectrum, is the tradi-
tional balance-of-hardship test. Under this test:
[flour factors enter into the determination of whether to grant or to with-
hold interim injunctive relief: (a) plaintiff's likelihood of success in the un-
derlying dispute between the parties; (b) whether plaintiff will suffer irrepa-
rable injury if interim relief is denied; (c) the injury to defendant if an
injunction is issued; and (d) the public interest.8 5
Courts apply this more stringent test to prevent subject management
from abusing preliminary injunctions for "allegedly" fraudulent and de-
ceptive tender offers."'
Federal courts in Virginia presently follow the balance-of-hardship ap-
proach."37 These courts provide further guidelines regarding the degree of
importance assigned to each factor:
There is a correlation between the likelihood of plaintiff's success and the
probability of injury to him. If the likelihood of success is great, the need
131. See, e.g., Page Communication Eng'rs, Inc. v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994, 996-97 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c)).
132. E.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d
Cir. 1969).
133. "Irreparable injury justifying an injunction is that which cannot be adequately com-
pensated in damages, or for which damages cannot be compensable in money.... ." Even
then, an injunction "should issue only where the party seeking [the injunction] . . . is
threatened with irreparable loss or injury without adequate remedy at law... "Greenberg
v. De Salvo, 254 La. 1019, , 229 So.2d 83, 86 (1969).
134. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 418 U.S. 919 (1974); D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) % 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1974).
135. Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting North Carolina
State Ports v. Dart Containerline Co., 592 F.2d 749, 750 (4th Cir. 1979)).
136. See, e.g., Mobile Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Scott v.
Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
137. See, e.g., Dan River, 701 F.2d at 283.
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for showing the probability of irreparable harm is less. Conversely, if the
likelihood of success is remote, there must be a strong showing of the
probability of irreparable injury to justify issuance of the injunction."-
The courts have held that these standards are fully applicable in cases
involving tender offers and the strictures of the Williams Act.13 9 Should
the Virginia petitioner ultimately succeed in satisfying this balance-of-
hardship test, the court will grant a preliminary injunction.
The degree of preliminary injunctive relief imposed in a particular situ-
ation usually depends upon the nature of the violation. If the violation is
relatively minor, a court will generally enjoin the perpetrator from voting
his shares or otherwise attempting to acquire control over the subject
company until he complies with the Williams Act.140 If the violation is
serious, the court may supplement injunctive relief with other equitable
remedies, such as allowing shareholders a reasonable time to withdraw
their stock 4 1 or ordering total divestiture of all stock acquired by the
bidder."42 These more stringent remedies are used only when further dis-
closure would be irrelevant and where no other remedy is available td
prevent a bidder from profiting from wrongdoing.'"
(ii). Permanent Injunctions
In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp."' the Supreme Court indicated
that permanent injunctive relief may be a remedy for a violation of the
Williams Act.145 Following a full hearing on the merits, a court is empow-
ered to alter the circumstances in accordance with the court's under-
standing of justice and equity."18 Once a permanent injunction has been
issued, the respondent is forever barred from engaging in the proscribed
138. Id. (quoting North Carolina State Ports v. Dart Containerline Co., 592 F.2d 749, 750
(4th Cir. 1979)).
139. 701 F.2d at 283.
140. See, e.g., Life Investors, Inc. v. AGO Holding Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 98,356 (8th Cir. Oct. 21, 1981) (enjoining further tender offer activity
until bidder makes adequate disclosure under § 14(d) and (e)); Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427
F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970) (enjoining defendant from voting stock, requesting a special share-
holders' meeting, or acquiring additional shares until filing a Schedule 13D); Cattlemen's
Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (enjoining defendant from voting any
shares acquired during the period of violation).
141. Mobile Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1981). In this case,
U.S. Steel Corporation coupled a tender offer with two illegal options. The court struck the
illegal options and ordered U.S. Steel to keep the tender offer open to give shareholders a
reasonable time to withdraw their shares.
142. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,742, 98,878 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
143. See Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d at 377.
144. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
145. Id. at 59 n.9.
146. United States v. Diapulse Mfg. Corp. of Am., 262 F. Supp. 728, 730 (D. Conn. 1967).
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activities. 147 Because participants in a tender offer need relief quickly,
most cases under the Williams Act involve requests for preliminary rather
than permanent injunctive relief.141
b. Damages
The general trend is to deny damages for violations of the Williams
Act.149 This is not to say, however, that a stockholder cannot recover for
any damage suffered. Damage actions under the Williams Act are gov-
erned by section 28(a),150 which limits recovery to a claimant's actual
damages.151
It is well settled that section 28(a) allows recovery for compensatory
but not punitive damages,1 52 though different theories have been devel-
oped to recompense the plaintiff for his loss. Most courts follow the out-
of-pocket rule.5 8 The purpose of this rule is to compensate the plaintiff
for any loss sustained and to restore him to his position prior to the de-
fendant's fraudulent actions.'M The plaintiff is entitled to "the difference
between the contract price, or the price paid, and the real or actual value
at the date of the sale, together with such outlays as are attributable to
the defendant's conduct."1 55
B. SEC Relief
A subject corporation may present evidence of disclosure violations
before the SEC and request that the SEC take steps to alleviate the prob-
lem. Should the SEC decide to act, it has various tools at its disposal,
including administrative sanctions, injunctive proceedings, and referrals
to the Department of Justice for criminal procecution. These enforcement
alternatives permit the SEC to choose a remedy or a combination of rem-
edies in order to fashion corrective action that most effectively protects
147. Because the respondent is forever barred from engaging in the activity, courts are
very reluctant to grant permanent injunctions. See, e.g., SEC v. Northeastern Fin. Corp.,
268 F. Supp. 412 (D.N.J. 1967).
148. E. ARANow, H. EmHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 83, at 129.
149. Virginia courts are an exception to this trend. See, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex
Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1225 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
151. Id.
152. See Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1313 (2d Cir. 1977);
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 781 (3d Cir. 1976).
153. See generally Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the
Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 277 (1977); Note, The Measure of
Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371
(1974).
154. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §549 comment g (1977).
155. Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
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the public interest.156
The SEC, in undertaking its administrative and enforcement responsi-
bilities, has employed adjudication, rulemaking, and legislation. However,
this "enforcement machinery" is used to ensure statutory compliance
rather than to effect relief for investors. Investors must seek their own
relief for violations of federal securities regulations.157
1. Administrative Proceedings
Two courses are available to the SEC should it choose to proceed ad-
ministratively for alleged disclosure violations: Section 15(c)(4) and trad-
ing suspensions.
a. Section 15(c)(4)
Section 15(c)(4)' 58 provides:
If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that any
person subject to the provisions of section 781 or 78m of this title or subsec-
tion (d) of this section [Public Law Sections 12, 13, or 15(d)] or any rule or
regulation thereunder has failed to comply with any such- provision, rule, or
regulation in any material respect, the Commission may publish its findings
and issue an order requiring such person to comply with such provision or
such rule or regulation thereunder upon such terms and conditions and
within such time as the Commission may specify in such order.1 9
This statutory provision enables the SEC to compel a bidder who filed
an inadequate, misleading, or false Schedule 13D statement to make ap-
propriate revisions. Similarly, a bidder who fails to file any statement
could be compelled to file by a section 15(c)(4) proceeding.16 0
b. Suspensions of Trading
The SEC has the power to summarily suspend all trading on a national
securities exchange for a period not exceeding ten days.1 6 ' While a bidder
156. Ferrara, SEC Division of Trading and Markets: Detection, Investigation and En-
forcement of Selected Practices That Impair Investor Confidence in the Capital Markets,
16 How. L.J. 950, 964-65 (1971).
157. E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 29, at 278.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1982).
159. Id. The Supreme Court has determined that the SEC, in an administrative proceed-
ing, must base its findings on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard rather than the
clear-and-convincing standard needed in private actions. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102
(1981).
160. E. APNow & H. EiNHORN supra note 29, at 278-79.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1982). Presently, the suspension order can only last 10 days. Pre-
viously, the SEC followed the practice of "rolling over" suspension orders for successive
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is not prohibited from accepting shares tendered by persons other than
broker-dealers, most will refrain from doing so, as the bidder's acceptance
of tendered shares may subject him to further liability under the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities regulations.'62
2. Judicial Relief
Enforcement of the federal securities regulations sometimes requires
the SEC to procure an injunction against the violator. Section 21(d) of
the Exchange Act gives the SEC authority to initiate action in the appro-
priate United States district court' s and to obtain injunctive relief for
disclosure violations.l"" Injunctive relief is the SEC's primary civil remedy
under the federal securities regulations.'6 5 The SEC may seek a prelimi-
nary injunction to compel compliance with the disclosure laws' or a per-
manent injunction if there is reasonable likelihood that the defendant will
periods of 10 days to keep the suspension in effect for a longer period of time. This practice
is no longer allowed. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978). The Court in Sloan left open
the question whether a second summary suspension could be entered on a different set of
circumstances. Id. at 110.
162. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 29, at 279.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982). This section states:
Wherever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to
engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter,
the rules or regulations thereunder, the rules of a national securities exchange or reg-
istered securities association of which such person is a member or a person associated
with a member, the rules of a registered clearing agency in which such person is a
participant, or the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, it may in its
discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or the United States courts
of any territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to
enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary
injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. The Commission may
transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices as may
constitute a violation of any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations
thereunder to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the neces-
sary criminal proceedings under this chapter.
While a literal reading of this section would result in limiting courts to enjoining viola-
tions of the Exchange Act, courts, once jurisdiction is properly invoked, have the discretion-
ary power to grant equitable relief based upon the rationale that one who violates securities
regulations should not be allowed to profit from his wrongdoing. E. ARANow & H. ENHORN,
supra note 29, at 281.
164. The jurisdiction of a federal district court to hear actions is conferred by § 27 of the
Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)-(e) (1982). In recent years, the SEC has obtained ancilliary
jurisdiction allowing the court to grant additional equitable relief to accompany an injunc-
tion. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (defen-
dants were required to disgorge profits earned in transactions involving disclosure viola-
tions); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103-05 (2d Cir. 1972)
(defendants were ordered to rescind transactions involving disclosure violations).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982).
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continue to violate the Act.167
C. Criminal Proceedings
Criminal sanctions may be imposed for willful violations of the federal
securities laws.16 8 While the SEC is granted broad subpoena powers to
investigate apparent violations, 69 it may not initiate criminal proceedings
sua sponte. Upon completion of an investigation, the SEC must refer the
matter to the United States Department of Justice, detailing the criminal
conduct and recommending that violators be indicted and prosecuted.170
If the Department of Justice concurs, it will then institute criminal
proceedings.11
Criminal sanctions are extremely uncommon. 17 2 However, one may
surmise that the probability of criminal prosecution for disclosure viola-
tions will increase where there is an obvious or repeated failure to comply
with the federal securities regulations or where the nature of the violation
is the principal cause of substantial losses for shareholders.173
D. Remedies Under the Virginia Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act
The Virginia Act, unlike the Williams Act, expressly authorizes civil,174
as well as criminal,1 75 sanctions. The civil liabilities section, by its own
terms, applies only to infractions of the actual takeover bid and disclos-
ure requirements.176 It imposes civil liability upon the bidder and every
other person who materially aids or participates in the takeover bid.177
167. See, e.g., SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1980); SEC v.
Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (an injunction should be is-
sued where the defendant is shown to have "a propensity or natural inclination to violate
the securities law"). For a discussion on modifying or dissolving SEC injunctions, see gener-
ally Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions - Standards for Their Imposition,
Modification, and Dissolution, 66 CoRN=a L. REv. 27 (1980).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982). "Willful" violations are construed by the courts to mean that
the defendant must know he is committing a wrongful act, but he does not have to know the
specific SEC rule he is violating. United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)-(b) (1982).
170. See, e.g., id. § 78u(d) (1982); see also E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 29, at
284.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982); E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 29, at 284.
172. See E. ARANow & H. EINnORN, supra note 29, at 285 (there have been no reported
criminal prosecutions involving tender offers to date).
173. Id. at 286.
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-539 (Repl. Vol. 1978). Civil actions have a two-year statute of
limitations. Id. § 13.1-539(d).
175. Id. § 13.1-536.
176. Id. § 13.1-539. The statute specifically provides that these rights are in addition to
any other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity. Id. § 13.1-539(f). Thus, a
person aggrieved by an infraction not specifically covered is not entirely without recourse.
177. While these persons are considered jointly and severally liable, any of the parties,
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The remedy provided for shareholders (which indirectly benefits incum-
bent management) includes rescission, the return of tendered shares and
dividends received, and attorneys' fees."5s If the bidder no longer pos-
sesses the stock, the shareholder will receive the substantial equivalent in
damages. 7
9
The State Corporation Commission (SCC) is authorized to administer
criminal sanctions for disclosure violations sua sponte"' This regulatory
agency has been given the power of a court of record to issue both inter-
locutory and permanent injunctions. 8" In addition, the SCC may punish
for contempt, as would a court of equity, anyone violating these injunc-
tions. 82 Finally, the SCC may choose to prosecute a disclosure violation
as a misdemeanor, 83 or to conduct its own hearings and punish violations
by imposing a penalty of up to five thousand dollars.18 4 To accomplish its
enforcement task, the SCC may make any investigation, either inside or
outside the state, it deems necessary to determine whether a party has
violated, or is preparing to violate, the provisions of the Act or any order
or injunction issued by the SCC.8 5
IV. CIVI RICO AS A REMEDY FOR SECURITIES LAW VIOLATIONS
A. Introduction
In an attempt to combat the proliferation of organized crime in the
United States, Congress in 1970 enacted the Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA).'8 Title IX of OCCA, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO), 87 was promulgated in an effort to eradicate the
infiltration of organized crime and racketeering' 8 into American busi-
except the bidder, may escape liability if "he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is
alleged to exist." Id. § 13.1-539(b).
178. Id. § 13.1-539(a)(2)(i).
179. Id. § 13.1-539(a)(2)(ii).
180. Id. § 13.1-534 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
181. Id. § 13.1-535 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
182. Id. These injunctions have the same force and effect as do judicial injunctions. See
supra notes 127-48 and accompanying text.
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-536 (Repl. Vol. 1978). If convicted of a misdemeanor, a person
may be fined up to $5,000, sentenced to one year in jail, or both.
184. Id. § 13.1-537.
185. Id. § 13.1-534. To insure service of process on out-of-state bidders, the Virginia Act
includes a long-arm statute which states, "Every nonresident offeror who makes a takeover
bid shall be deemed to have appointed the clerk of the Commission as his agent upon whom
maybe served ... process .... ." Id. § 13.1-540.
186. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
187. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
188. Racketeering is defined as "[a]n organized conspiracy to commit the crimes of extor-
tion or coercion, or attempts to commit extortion or coercion" as well as "[a]ctivities of
organized criminals who extort money from legitimate businesses by violence or other forms
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nesses.' s8 Although RICO is not a securities law, anyone who fraudulently
buys or sells securities may be subject to RICO's powerful sanctions.1 90
Violators of the Act face both criminal"' and civil penalties 92 in actions
brought by the government, as well as treble damages in suits brought by
private parties whose businesses have been injured by a RICO viola-
tion.193 Until recently, however, private parties have not pursued these
available civil RICO remedies.' In the civil RICO actions that have been
filed, some courts have attempted to restrict RICO's application because
of its broad and far-reaching powers, while others have favored a liberal
interpretation.1 95
B. The Structure and Requirements of RICO
1. The Racketeering Activity Requirement
The heart of a RICO violation is "racketeering activity," 9 6 identified in
of threats or intimidation or conduct of illegal enterprises .... " BLACK'S LAW DICIoNARY
1132 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). RICO identifies those types of conduct that constitute racketeering
but does not define the term. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
189. Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1073: "It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of
organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gather-
ing process... and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." See also McClellan, The Organized
Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55,
56-60 (1970). (Senator McClellan, a proponent of the bill, discusses the need for the bill and
cites statistics on the involvement of organized crime in business.)
190. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1982).
191. Id. § 1963.
192. Id. § 1964. See infra text accompanying notes 265-78.
193. Id. § 1964(c).
194. By 1978, only two cases involving private RICO claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) had
been reported. See Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. DeL 1978)
(civil action brought by the bank against a defendant who had an earlier criminal conviction
under OCCA); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (action by customers
of an answering service alleging that defendants had conspired to fix prices and had willfully
overcharged customers).
195. For cases applying a restrictive interpretation of RICO, see, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v.
Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981),
modified, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
For cases applying a liberal interpretation, see Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,214 (D. Mass. Nov. 17,
1981); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd on other grounds,
527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); see generally Note, Civil
RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HAv. L. Rav. 1101
(1982) (discussing both liberal and restrictive applications of civil RICO).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982) provides:
"[R]acketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnap-
ping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dan-
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the Act as any of four different types of illegal activities. First, RICO
prohibits the use or investment of income derived from a pattern of rack-
eteering activity 91 to acquire or operate an interest in an enterprise e"
which affects interstate or foreign commerce.199 Second, the Act forbids
the acquisition or maintenance of an interest in any enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity.200 Third, it prohibits anyone associated 20 1
gerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section
224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472 and 473 (relating to counterfeiting),
section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under
section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and wel-
fare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section
1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to
mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction
of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), Section
1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (re-
lating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to
racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering para-
phernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955
(relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315
(relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2341-46 (relating to
trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic),
(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (deal-
ing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c)
(relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud con-
nected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise deal-
ing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United
States.
197. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text, discussing the definition of a "pat-
tern" of racketeering activity.
198. See infra notes 220-29 and accompanying text, defining an "enterprise."
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of sec-
tion 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open
market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or partic-
ipating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be un-
lawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the
members of his immediate family and his or their accomplices in any pattern [of]
racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not
amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class,
and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of
the issuer.
200. Id. § 1962(b) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, di-
rectly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
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with the enterprise from conducting business affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity.20 2 Finally, RICO constrains any person from con-
spiring to violate any of these provisions.20 3 Under this broad definition of
racketeering activity, certain takeover bid strategies can clearly fall under
the auspices of RICO.
2. The Pattern of Racketeering Activity Requirement
Before RICO sanctions can be imposed, there must be more than one
incident of racketeering activity; the challenger must demonstrate a pat-
tern of racketeering activity. A pattern of racketeering requires proof of
at least two acts prohibited by RICO,2 "one of which occurred after
[RICO was enacted] and the last of which occurred within ten years...
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. '20 5 Courts are
divided on whether a nexus must exist between these two acts of
racketeering. 0 6
A prerequisite to challenging a corporate takeover attempt under RICO
is proof that the defendant committed at least two acts of racketeering in
the past ten years.20 7 This could be satisfied by a showing that at least
some part of the income derived from racketeering activity was used in
the acquisition of an interest in another business. 20 8 The other racketeer-
ing act need not be a securities violation, though depending upon the
court, a common link between the two acts may be necessary.209
In Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn,21 0 Dan River alleged racketeering activity
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
201. See infra notes 230-41 and accompanying text.
202. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to con-
duct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
203 Id. § 1962(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any
of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
204. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
206. Compare United States v. Stefsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (a widely
cited case stating that "racketeering acts [must be] connected with each other by some com-
mon scheme, plan, or motive so as to constitute a pattern."), aff'd on other grounds, 527
F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) with United States v. Elliott, 571
F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.) (stating there was "no reason for reading [a requirement of
interrelatedness] into the statutory definition"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
207. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
208. 18 U.S.C. 1962(a) (1982). See United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 628-29 (7th
Cir. 1978); Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fan. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,215 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
209. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
210. 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983).
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after a "buy-me-out-or-face-a-takeover" ultimatum by the defendant
Icahn, charging that Icahn's interest in Dan River was being financed
with money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity.211 Dan River
asserted prior offenses by Icahn of securities fraud and mail fraud, as well
as Icahn's earlier uses of a "buy-me-out-or-face-a-takeover" strategy.212
The Fourth Circuit, applying a restrictive interpretation of RICO, found
several flaws in Dan River's claim, primarily Dan River's difficulty in
proving Icahn's criminal intent,21s a prerequisite to a finding of mail or
securities fraud.214 The court noted that defendant Icahn's reliance upon
legal counsel constituted evidence of good faith, thereby rebutting any
inference of criminal intent.21 5
In Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.,2 1 a recent case closely
paralleling Dan River, the United States District Court of Massachusetts
required only that the plaintiff allege a series of predicate racketeering
activities to establish a cause of action.21 The Spencer court felt it con-
sistent with congressional intent to look only at whether the conduct al-
leged fit within the generic categories of RICO. 218 This more liberal inter-
pretation of RICO contrasts sharply with the restrictive approach applied
by the Dan River court.219 The threshold requirements for establishing a
pattern of racketeering activity in a takeover bid situation will thus vary,
depending on the jurisdiction in which the case is brought.
3. The Enterprise Requirement
A RICO action also requires that the violation be against an enter-
prise.220 The Act defines "enterprise" as "an individual, partnership, cor-
poration, association, or other legal entity, and union or group associated
in fact although not a legal entity. '221 This loose definition has created
controversy and dissension among the courts. The courts have interpreted
the RICO definition of enterprise to include a wide range of activities,
211. Id. at 282.
212. Id. at 289-90. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
213. 701 F.2d at 290.
214. See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363 n.11 (4th Cir. 1979) (criminal in-
tent is a requirement for mail fraud), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v.
Vandersee, 279 F.2d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1960) (criminal intent is a requirement for securities
fraud), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 943 (1961).
215. 701 F.2d at 291. The Dan River court seems to establish yet another requirement for
an action under RICO, the "lack of good faith" test, illustrating again how courts can im-
pose hurdles for plaintiffs in an effort to restrict the broad powers of RICO.
216. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 98,361, at 92,214 (D. Mass.
Nov. 17, 1981).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See generally Note, supra note 195.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(b) (1982).
221. Id.
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including private businesses,222  government agencies,2 23 prostitution
rings,2 24 and labor organizations. 2 25 Until 1981, the greatest controversy
over this definition was whether the enterprise need be legitimate.226 The
Supreme Court that year, in United States v. Turkette,27 rejected the
assertion that RICO applies only to defendants who have infiltrated legit-
imate enterprises228 and stated that the defendant could be associated
with either a legitimate or an illegitimate entity.229
Once the existence of an enterprise recognized by RICO is established,
an issue arises over the association between the enterprise and the defen-
dant.2 0 The defendant must personally have some association with the
enterprise and a direct or indirect participation in its affairs "through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt."'23 '
In a case of securities fraud, many persons or organizations will likely
have little, if any, knowledge of illegalities in the takeover attempt.
Courts probably will not extend RICO to cover such persons; the poten-
tial, however, for such an extension remains. The Fourth Circuit, in
United States v. Mandel,3 2 held that the defendant must have some in-
volvement in the operation or management of the business to meet the
conduct or participation requirement of RICO.2 33 On the other hand, the
Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Elliott,23' indicated that virtually any-
one associated with the enterprise is liable.23 5
222. See, e.g., United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding a res-
taurant to be an enterprise), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. DePalma,
461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding a theater to be an enterprise).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Frtumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes was an enterprise), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding a city police
department to be an enterprise), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
224. See, e.g., United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247, modified, 582 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
225. United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
226. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66
F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEWP. L.Q. 1009, 1025-
28, nn.89-91 (1980).
227. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
228. Id. at 591-93.
229. Id. at 582.
230. See generally Note, Application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) to Securities Violations, 8 J. CoRP. L. 411, 424-26 (1983) (discussing the
association of the individual with the enterprise).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
232. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
233. 591 F.2d at 1374-75 (finding that Governor Mandel's eight percent limited partner-
ship interest was not sufficient involvement to constitute a RICO violation).
234. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
235. See 571 F.2d at 902-03. In the words of the court, "the RICO net is woven tightly to
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The Supreme Court, in United States v. Turkette,28 adopted some re-
strictions that may prevent abuse and misapplication of RICO. The Court
held that an "'enterprise' is not the pattern of racketeering activity; it is
an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it en-
gages. '23 7 In order to secure a RICO conviction, "the government must
prove both the existence of an 'enterprise' and the connected 'pattern of
racketeering activity.' "238 The Supreme Court articulated a three-prong
test for this enterprise requirement. First, the Court defined an enterprise
as "a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of en-
gaging in a course of conduct."23 9 Second, the Court stated that an "en-
terprise is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or infor-
mal . . .,o Finally, the Court set forth the requirement that there
must be "evidence that the various associates function as a continuing
nit.,,242
In a takeover attempt, the three-prong test espoused in Turkette could
restrict a misapplication of RICO by denying its application to persons
only remotely connected to the wrongdoing. By requiring both a common
purpose of engaging in racketeering activity and an ongoing organization
whose associates function as a continuing unit, the test probably affords
protection for persons only remotely involved in a takeover scheme. The
question still remains as to whether this test is underinclusive, thus al-
lowing some defendants to escape a RICO conviction.242
4. The Organized Crime Requirement
Neither the legislative history243 nor the express language of RICO sug-
gests that Congress intended plaintiffs to prove that defendants are asso-
entrap even the smallest fish, those peripherally involved with the enterprise." Id. at 903.
The court also noted that "[u]nder the statute, it is irrelevant that each defendant partici-
pated in the enterprise's affairs through different, even unrelated crimes, so long as we may
reasonably infer that each crime was intended to further the enterprise's affairs." Id. at 902-
03.
236. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
237. Id. at 583.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
456 (1982) (defendants who were involved in a massive securities fraud operation escaped a
RICO conviction for failure to meet a three-prong test patterned largely on the one set forth
in Turkette).
243. H. R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 186, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4007, 4032-36. See id. at 4081 (dissenting views of Rep. Conyers, Mikva, and
Ryan); see generally McClellan, supra note 189, at 142-43 (discussing lack of congressional
intent to impose organized crime requirement).
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ciated with organized crime.244 Some courts, however, have imposed such
a requirement to restrict the application of the Act.245 Other courts have
rejected this interpretation, reasoning that this was not the intent of the
statute's drafters.246
In Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, the Fourth Circuit did not directly address
whether Dan River would have to establish Icahn's connection with or-
ganized crime. 247 The court, however, seemed to follow those courts giving
RICO a restrictive application, stating that "Congress was out to attack
the problem of organized crime, not the problems of corporate control
and risk arbitrage. '248 In Spencer Cos., however, the Massachusetts Dis-
trict Court espoused the liberal view and explicitly rejected the require-
ment of an association with organized crime.249 This view was echoed by
the District Court of Ohio, in Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Re-
sources, Ltd.,250 which held it unnecessary for plaintiff "to prove or even
allege that defendant is a member of organized crime.")251
5. The Competitive Injury Requirement
Several courts have limited plaintiffs under civil RICO by imposing a
"competitive injury" requirement.252 Under RICO a private plaintiff sus-
taining an injury to himself or to his business may bring a civil action.253
The Act leaves "injury" undefined, and courts have consequently had dif-
ficulty determining what type of injury gives rise to a violation. Some
courts have acted to impose limitations on the "injury" requirement. In
Landmark Savings & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co.,254 the
244. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
245. See, e.g., Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
246. See, e.g., United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 663 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 456 (1982); United States v. Uni Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 908 (1982); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,735-37 (N.D. Ohio July 11, 1982).
247. 701 F.2d at 291.
248. Id. The general restrictive application of RICO by the Fourth Circuit seems to indi-
cate that the court would require a connection between a RICO defendant and organized
crime.
249. Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,214-15 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
250. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,742, at 93,735 (N.D. Ohio July
11, 1982).
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(widely cited case setting forth the competitive injury requirement).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue .... .
254. 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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court held that the injury must be "something more or different from the
predicate acts.' '25s Although not requiring that a plaintiff demonstrate a
competitive injury, the court suggests the plaintiff should be a direct vic-
tim of the predicate crime. 256 In Spencer Cos., the court held that direct
injuries from the infiltration by defendants through a pattern of racke-
teering activity were sufficient to support an action. 57 Another court,
however, has held that no action will lie unless commercial harm results
from a racketeering enterprise injury.258
Other courts have declined altogether to impose this restrictive compet-
itive injury requirement.2 59 In Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn,260 the
court expressly held that Congress did not intend a competitive injury
requirement.2 1 Furthermore, the Hellenic Lines court noted that "RICO
does not countenance racketeering activity [even when] it is done uni-
formly among competing concerns.
262
Even those courts which require no proof of competitive injury are con-
cerned with potential abuse of RICO.263 Absent statutory reform, the
competitive injury requirement may be a logical method by which the
judiciary can restrict RICO's applicability.26'
C. Civil Penalties
Section 1964 of RICO provides multiple civil remedies for violations of
the Act.26 5 Federal courts have jurisdiction to prevent or restrain viola-
tions of RICO, and have express powers to grant equitable relief, includ-
ing divestiture of a violator's interest in an enterprise, restrictions on the
violator's future activities or investments, and dissolution or reorganiza-
255. Id. at 208-09.
256. Id. at 209.
257. Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,216 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981). The court insisted that a plaintiff
demonstrate a "legally compensable injury" before initiating discovery. Id. at 92,217.
258. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136-37 (D. Mass.
1982) (neither commercial harm nor racketeering enterprise injury were defined by the
court).
259. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 682 (N.D.
Ind. 1982); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
260. 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
261. Id. at 248.
262. Id.
263. Spencer Cos., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at
92,217.
264. See Campbell, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Racketeer or Business-
man?, 36 Sw. L.J. 925, 949 (1982).
265. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982). RICO also provides for criminal penalties of up to $25,000 in
fines, up to 20 years' imprisonment, and forfeiture of any interest acquired in violation of §
1962. Id. § 1963. Criminal penalties under RICO are beyond the scope of this note.
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tion of an enterprise.268 In addition, the Act provides for a governmental
civil RICO action to be brought by the Attorney General.61 Finally, pri-
vate parties are given the right to sue for treble damages and costs, in-
cluding reasonable attorneys' fees.268
The major dispute to arise over the interpretation of this section has
been the question of whether a private litigant may obtain equitable re-
lief under section 1964(c).29 A literal reading of the statute provides that
only the Attorney General can seek injunctive relief.270 Two courts, how-
ever, have expanded the scope of this section and have interpreted RICO
as granting a private right to injunctive relief.271 Other courts have ex-
pressed doubt as to a private party's right to this equitable remedy.
272
The legislative history of RICO does not clearly express Congress's in-
tent to grant private plaintiffs a right to injunctive relief.273 Recent Su-
266. Id. § 1964(a) provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and re-
strain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, includ-
ing, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or
indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from
engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of
which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization
of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
267. Id. § 1964(b) provides:
The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any action
brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed as soon as
practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final determination
thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or
take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds,
as it shall deem proper.
268. Id. § 1964(c) provides: "[A]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including reasonable attorneys' fee."
269. See Campbell, supra note 264, at 935-36.
270. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982). See supra note 267.
271. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). This is
the only case granting injunctive relief to a private party under RICO. See also Vietnamese
Fishermen's Assoc. v. Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (court as-
sumed that equitable relief was available under RICO, but denied an injunction on other
grounds).
272. See, e.g., Dan River v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685
F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982) (which did not reach the "difficult question" of the ability of
the court to grant injunctive relief under RICO to private plaintiffs); Trane Co. v. O'Connor
Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301, 307 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983) (ex-
pressing serious doubt RICO can be invoked to secure injunctive relief).
273. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4010 (House Committee on Judiciary clarified that § 1964 provides
only relief of treble damages to a private party alleging a RICO violation); see also Blakey &
Gettings, supra note 226, at 1014, 1038 nn. 132-33, stating that equitable relief under RICO
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preme Court decisions indicate that a clear expression of congressional
intent is necessary to establish an implied right to injunctive relief where
the language of the statute itself is silent.2 7
4
In Dan River, the plaintiff's complaint sought solely equitable relief.2 75
The Fourth Circuit expressed substantial doubt as to whether this rem-
edy would be available to a private party such as Dan River.27 6 The court
further noted that Dan River would have to establish "that actions for
equitable relief are implied in the statute"2 "7 before any injunction would
be granted.
Thus, it remains unclear whether a private party who is the subject of a
takeover bid would be entitled to injunctive relief. Since RICO does not
expressly grant such a remedy, the court would have to look to congres-
sional intent to imply the right of action.2 78
D. The Future of the Application of RICO in a Takeover Bid
An examination of developing case law on the application of RICO to
civil actions points out substantial barriers to a private party's ability to
bring a RICO claim during a takeover bid. The first problems lie in the
necessity to establish the requisite elements of racketeering activity, 279
pattern of racketeering activity,280 and enterprise.28 1 Assuming that a pri-
vate party is able to meet these elements, other hurdles follow. Courts,
concerned with the potential abuse in the application of RICO to "white
collar" crime, have sought other means to restrict RICO's far-reaching
powers. By imposing the organized crime28 2 and the competitive injury8 3
requirements, courts have been successful in restricting RICO in civil ac-
tions. Ironically, the likelihood of a private party succeeding in a RICO
claim in a takeover bid situation will probably depend on the particular
is available to private parties, but citing no case authorities. Congressman Sam Steiger pro-
posed an amendment to clarify the scope of remedies for private plaintiffs under RICO,
which he believed already granted a right of injunctive relief to private plaintiffs. Congress-
man Steiger withdrew his proposed amendment at the request of Congressman Richard Poff
to permit further study by the Judiciary Committee. 116 CONG. REc. 35,346-47 (1970).
274. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S.
1, 13 (1981) (stating that, absent statutory language, inquiry must focus on legislative in-
tent); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578-79 (1979) (finding no implied
cause of action in the absence of congressional intent).
275. 701 F.2d at 290.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Campbell, supra note 264, at 936. See supra note 274.
279. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 220-29 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 243-51 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 252-64 and accompanying text.
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court hearing the case.
Dan River and Spencer are excellent examples of the divergent ap-
proaches courts have taken when applying RICO to the challenge of a
takeover bid. Although it is possible to distinguish these two cases,2s8 they
clearly illustrate the difference between the restrictive interpretation8 5
and the liberal interpretation 286 of RICO by different circuits. Until the
Supreme Court steps in and addresses these varying interprtations, the
confusion in the lower courts will continue, and the plaintiff's best rem-
edy will be astute forum shopping.
In evaluating civil RICO case law development, the major problem aris-
ing in the majority of cases is determining the Act's legislative intent.
Certainly the Supreme Court can delve into the legislative history of
RICO to attempt to determine congressional intent. A more likely solu-
tion, however, would be for Congress to undertake a revision of RICO.
Many proponents have urged such congressional revision to clarify the
application of RICO in civil actions.287 Until Congress or the Supreme
Court acts, it will remain unclear whether a private party can succeed in a
claim of a RICO violation in a takeover bid scheme.
Carolyn C. Lavecchia
R. Stephen Nelson, Jr.
284. In Spencer Cos., there was a clear nexus beween the predicate acts since both acts
alleged related to the acquisition of the plaintiff's shares. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361, at 92,215. On the other hand, in Dan River there was no clear
nexus between the predicate acts, and the court questioned whether the plaintiff could in
fact prove the existence of earlier RICO violations. 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983).
285. Dan River, 701 F.2d at 289-91. The Fourth Circuit applies not only a more restrictive
approach to the application of RICO, but expresses doubt that Congress intended RICO to
be used to attack problems of corporate control. Id. at 291. Because of the broad language of
RICO, a court fearing the far-reaching powers of the statute has multiple avenues to select
to restrict the application of RICO to "white collar" crime. Had Dan River been decided by
a court applying a liberal interpretation of RICO, the outcome would likely have been
different.
286. Spencer Cos., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %98,361, at
92,214-16. The Massachusetts District Court believed that Congress intended for the provi-
sions of RICO to be liberally construed to attack "white collar" crime.
287. See Note, supra note 195, at 1118-20.

